INDIA BUILT THEM : WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TECHNOLOGY THEY LEFT BEHIND?

 

A BIZ MASALA FORENSIC INVESTIGATION

INDIA BUILT THEM.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE TECHNOLOGY THEY LEFT BEHIND?

HMT • HMT Watches • Praga Tools • Hindustan Cables • IDPL • BHPV/HPVP

The public money, missed opportunities and industrial capabilities behind the fate of India’s public-sector pioneers

Conceptual editorial artwork; it is not a documentary photograph of any specific company or factory.

The question is not simply why they failed

India’s public-sector industrial enterprises helped build capabilities that were scarce in the decades after Independence: machine tools, precision engineering, telecom cables, heavy process equipment and pharmaceutical manufacturing. Several later stopped production, entered closure or liquidation, or were absorbed into larger enterprises. Their trajectories are different, but they raise one shared question: when a strategically useful enterprise began to fail, did India make a timely, evidence-based choice between revival, merger, strategic sale and closure—or did years of distress narrow the options until closure became the default?

This investigation does not argue that every loss-making public enterprise should be kept alive. A company can consume public money without delivering public value. The case for revival must be proved through a credible market, modern technology, professional management and time-bound milestones. But closure also needs a case: what was tried, what failed, what alternatives were assessed, and what productive capability would be lost?

First, separate the outcomes

The Ministry of Heavy Industries currently lists HMT Watches, Hindustan Cables and Bharat Pumps & Compressors among CPSEs under closure. Its liquidation list includes Hindustan Photo Films and Hindustan Paper Corporation. BHPV followed a different path: after becoming a BHEL subsidiary in 2008, it was merged into BHEL in 2013 and renamed the Heavy Plates and Vessels Plant (HPVP). HMT Machine Tools remains operational; the government said in December 2025 that a technical committee had submitted recommendations on its revival. Praga Tools, whose origins date to 1943, was merged into HMT Machine Tools; the Praga Division remains listed on HMT Machine Tools’ official site. These are not interchangeable outcomes. [1–5]

Chart 1. Selected milestones. It is not a complete chronology of every company.

IDPL: the revival question government records leave open

Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Limited was established in 1961 with a mission tied to domestic production of essential medicines. It was declared sick in 1992. A parliamentary record from the 1990s shows that a BIFR-approved revival package was put into effect from April 1994, with an estimated package cost of ₹155 crore and government financial assistance reported at ₹140.31 crore by 1995–96. Yet the package missed its targets in the first year: production was about ₹199 crore against a target of ₹328 crore; sales were about ₹183 crore against ₹306 crore; and the company reported a substantial loss instead of the projected small profit. Parliamentary committees questioned the delay in reviewing management performance and the handling of later revival proposals. [6–8]

This is the crucial distinction: IDPL did receive a serious revival package. The question is whether it was well designed and effectively implemented, and whether subsequent options were properly tested. The historical record says the package included cash support, debt restructuring, asset-sale expectations, product diversification, a power sub-station and manpower rationalisation. A committee later recorded that the company did not meet operational targets and that progress in other parts of the package was unsatisfactory. A techno-economic viability review was then pursued. [7,8]

The later official position is sobering. In December 2025, the Department of Pharmaceuticals said IDPL, Hindustan Antibiotics and Bengal Chemicals had suffered sustained losses linked to management issues, cost competition, raw-material shortages, low capacity utilisation and operating losses. It also stated that no scheme had been implemented to modernise and revitalise these CPSEs to make them more competitive. The government had initiated IDPL closure steps. [9]

That statement does not prove that IDPL would have survived a modernisation programme. But it makes the counterfactual unavoidable: was the earlier package primarily financial rehabilitation, rather than an integrated industrial turnaround built around updated plant, quality compliance, a focused essential-medicines portfolio, dependable procurement, raw-material supply, working capital and accountable professional management? The available records justify the question; they do not yet prove the answer.

Chart 2. IDPL closure-period expenditure reported for FY2022–23 to FY2024–25. The ₹397.55 crore total is not lifetime taxpayer support and does not include all historic revival assistance. [9]

The fair conclusion is neither ‘IDPL definitely could have been saved’ nor ‘closure was inevitable’. The public record shows earlier revival attempts failed, and later modernisation was not implemented. Before closure is treated as the only rational option, the state should disclose the costed alternatives and explain why a time-bound, independently monitored revival was rejected or considered unviable.

HMT: a group cannot be reduced to its watch business

HMT’s story includes machine tools, watches, bearings, tractors and other activities spread across subsidiaries. In 2016, the government described HMT Watches, HMT Chinar Watches and HMT Bearings as chronically sick and approved closure decisions. In the same period, HMT Machine Tools was also reported among loss-making CPSEs, but it was not treated as identical to the watch subsidiaries. [10]

In December 2025, the government confirmed that HMT Machine Tools’ Kalamassery unit remained operational, while also acknowledging old plant and machinery, poor productivity, erosion of net worth and severe financial stress. A technical committee constituted in November 2024 had submitted its report on the company’s revival. [2]

This makes HMT Machine Tools a live industrial-policy test. The next question is whether a funded and executable plan exists: what equipment will be modernised, which products can compete, whether strategic customers can provide predictable orders, how R&D and skills will be renewed, and what milestones will be publicly monitored. A committee report is not the same as a funded turnaround, and a continuing factory is not by itself proof of commercial viability.

Praga Tools: the company name changed, but the division remains

Praga Tools began in Hyderabad in 1943 and became part of the HMT Machine Tools structure through merger. HMT Machine Tools’ official Praga Division page still identifies its Balanagar, Hyderabad location and describes machining capability for components up to 10 tonnes, CNC machinery and a tool room. [3]

Praga should therefore not be casually presented as a vanished factory. The forensic question is whether its equipment, workforce, technical know-how, customer base and production capacity are being used effectively within HMT Machine Tools. That requires current unit-level orders, utilisation, staffing, capex and financial records—not a conclusion based only on the loss of a standalone corporate identity.

Hindustan Cables: the thirteen-year gap

Hindustan Cables was established in 1952 to supply telecom cables. The Cabinet approved its closure in September 2016. The government said production had stopped in January 2003, as the telecom market shifted from wire-line to wireless networks; it also reported that earlier revival attempts and a proposed transfer of units to the defence establishment had not succeeded. [11]

The closure package included ₹1,309.90 crore in cash infusion and ₹3,467.15 crore in non-cash support through conversion of outstanding government loans, including interest, into equity. These categories should not be added and described as if they were all fresh cash expenditure. Nor does the announced package tell us the total amount ever spent on the enterprise, or how much was recovered from asset sales. [11]

Chart 3. Two distinct components of the HCL closure package announced in 2016; excludes the separate bank settlement and does not represent lifetime taxpayer cost. [11]

The key question is timing. If production stopped in 2003 and closure was approved in 2016, what was done during the intervening years? Did officials test diversification into newer cable technologies, a sale or transfer to another strategic operator, or an orderly exit earlier? The official release states that attempts failed; the underlying proposals and appraisals are needed to judge why.

BHPV: merger as an alternative to closure

Bharat Heavy Plates & Vessels was established in Visakhapatnam in 1966 to manufacture heavy engineering equipment. It was declared sick in 2005 and became a wholly owned BHEL subsidiary in 2008. The Cabinet approved its merger with BHEL in 2013, arguing that integration would improve tender participation, orders and vendor access. BHEL’s subsequent announcement described HPVP as a manufacturing unit with a specialised product profile serving sectors including oil, steel, cement and fertiliser. [12,13]

BHPV demonstrates a route between ‘keep the company unchanged’ and ‘close the plant’: integration into a larger engineering enterprise. But the merger should be judged by results, not by the legal act alone. A proper follow-up should compare orders, turnover, capex, utilisation, employment and product mix before and after merger, while accounting for changes in market conditions.

Public money: the numbers need disciplined accounting

Category	What to establish	What not to do
Cash support	Actual disbursements by year and purpose	Do not treat approved allocations as cash spent
Debt and interest	Principal, accrued interest, waivers, repayments and conversions	Do not count a loan and its later conversion to equity twice
Operating losses	Audited profit/loss and cash flow over time	Do not equate accounting losses with direct budgetary expenditure
Employee obligations	VRS/VSS, wages, pensions and statutory dues	Separate provisions from actual payments
Asset recovery	Realised proceeds, sale dates, transaction costs and disputes	Do not treat estimated land value as cash recovered
Capability and skills	Tooling, patents, approvals, technical records, trained workers and customers	Do not assume strategic capability has zero value because it is hard to price

Why these enterprises struggled: six hypotheses to test

·       Technology shifts. Wireless telecom, digital imaging and modern CNC equipment changed markets. The key is whether the change was foreseeable and whether investment followed.

·       Delayed modernisation. Old machinery, poor productivity and weak product development can erode competitiveness. HMT Machine Tools’ official account identifies old machinery and productivity as present concerns.

·       Procurement and customer access. Public buyers, tender rules, price competition, certification and order visibility can determine whether a domestic supplier can plan investment.

·       Governance and accountability. Management quality and operating autonomy matter, but specific claims need audited records or committee findings rather than generalisations.

·       Working capital and supply chains. Raw-material shortages, delayed customer payments and low utilisation can reinforce one another; new money alone cannot fix a weak product strategy.

·       Delayed decisions. Long periods between visible distress and final action can consume skills, assets and market share. The timeline must be reconstructed company by company.

A practical test before a strategic enterprise is closed

A credible policy should publish a comparable assessment of revival, merger, sale and closure, with independent technical and financial review.

Test	Evidence required	Decision question
Strategic value	Import dependence, health/security needs, supply-chain relevance	What public value would be lost?
Technical feasibility	Independent plant audit, technology gap, quality and product cost	Can investment produce a competitive plant?
Demand	Named customers, credible orders, procurement forecasts	Is there a real market?
Operating model	Professional leadership, skills plan, board autonomy and supplier strategy	Can execution problems be corrected?
Fiscal comparison	Costed revival, merger, sale and closure; actual asset recovery	Which route offers better risk-adjusted public value?
Exit discipline	12/24/36-month targets, quarterly reviews and stop/go triggers	How will endless rescue packages be prevented?

What the evidence supports—and what it does not

The evidence supports a conclusion that several public-sector industrial enterprises lost ground amid technology shifts, competition, operational weaknesses and prolonged financial distress. It also supports the need to distinguish different outcomes: HMT Watches and Hindustan Cables are listed under closure; Hindustan Photo Films is listed under liquidation; Praga’s division remains within HMT Machine Tools; BHPV was merged into BHEL; and HMT Machine Tools remains operational while facing serious financial challenges. [1–5,12,13]

The evidence does not yet support a single lifetime taxpayer-cost figure across these enterprises. Nor does it prove that every closure could have been avoided, that all management failures were culpable, or that a modernised IDPL would certainly have survived. These claims require company-level audited accounts, the full revival proposals, asset-sale records and independent technical assessments.

Conclusion: preserve capability, not corporate names at any cost

The strongest lesson is not that every old PSU should have survived. It is that India needs a transparent, timely and technically informed way to decide what to preserve when an industrial enterprise falters. Sometimes merger can preserve capability, as BHPV’s path suggests. Sometimes the market for a legacy product genuinely collapses. Sometimes a factory may still have valuable skills and tooling even when its old business model has failed.

IDPL remains the hardest question. Its earlier revival package missed targets, but parliamentary records also show repeated review and concern over delays; the later government account says no scheme had been implemented to modernise and revitalise the pharma CPSEs to make them competitive. The fair question is whether a properly designed, time-bound, independently monitored industrial turnaround was realistically assessed before closure became the course of action.

Taxpayers deserve a full account of the money spent and recovered. Citizens also deserve an account of the capabilities preserved or lost: machine-building skills, precision tooling, pharmaceutical manufacturing, technical workers and domestic supply options. Those benefits must be measured carefully, not romanticised—but neither should they be treated as zero.

Before closure, government should publish the diagnosis, costed alternatives and reasons for the chosen route. Where revival is justified, it should be time-bound, professionally managed and independently monitored. Where closure is justified, the state should disclose the fiscal settlement and preserve useful technology, skills and assets where feasible. The question is not whether every old PSU should survive. It is whether each decision was made with the seriousness India’s industrial future deserves.

Sources and documentary trail

1.       Ministry of Heavy Industries — CPSEs and status lists: https://www.heavyindustries.gov.in/en/central-public-sector-enterprises-cpses — Current status categories; accessed 10 Oct 2026.

2.       Ministry of Heavy Industries — CPSE dashboard: https://dash.heavyindustries.gov.in/ — Current list of CPSEs under closure and operational CPSEs.

3.       PIB — Revival of HMT Machine Tools Ltd, 2 Dec 2025: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2197546&lang=1&reg=6 — Operational status, financial stress and technical committee.

4.       HMT Machine Tools — Praga Division: https://www.hmtmachinetools.com/praga-division/ — Division address and manufacturing capabilities.

5.       HMT Machine Tools — About Machine Tools: https://www.hmtmachinetools.com/about-machine-tools/ — History and merger of Praga Tools into HMT Machine Tools.

6.       PIB — Modernisation of Pharma PSUs, 12 Dec 2025: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2202991&lang=1&reg=3 — IDPL history, failed revival packages, modernisation status and closure expenditure.

7.       Parliamentary record — Standing Committee report on IDPL revival: https://eparlib.sansad.in/bitstream/123456789/66105/1/13_Petroleum_%26_Natural_Gas_5.pdf — Historical BIFR revival package, targets and performance.

8.       Parliamentary record — IDPL revival package and implementation concerns: https://eparlib.sansad.in/bitstream/123456789/56496/1/petroleum_10_24_1995.pdf — Production/sales targets and committee scrutiny.

9.       PIB — Closure of Hindustan Cables Ltd, 28 Sep 2016: https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?lang=2&reg=3&relid=151196 — Production cessation, closure package and asset disposal.

10.    PIB — Closure of loss-making CPSEs, 1 Mar 2016: https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?lang=2&reg=48&relid=137121 — Government’s rationale for appraisal and closure of selected enterprises.

11.    PIB — Merger of BHPV with BHEL, 21 Feb 2013: https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?lang=2&reg=3&relid=92370 — BHPV history, BIFR distress and rationale for merger.

12.    BHEL — BHPV merged with BHEL, 6 Sep 2013: https://www.bhel.com/bhpv-merged-bhel-becomes-seventeenth-unit-bhel — Merger completion and HPVP designation.

Methodology, limitations and disclaimer

This is a public-record forensic feature, not a completed audit of every enterprise’s lifetime finances. The IDPL figure of ₹397.55 crore refers only to closure-period expenditure reported for FY2022–23 through FY2024–25; it is not lifetime government support. HCL’s cash infusion and debt-to-equity conversion are different categories. No consolidated taxpayer-cost total is offered because audited time series, historic assistance and actual asset recoveries have not been assembled on a comparable basis.

Before release, the editor should confirm the latest legal status, retrieve full committee reports and company accounts where available, and seek factual responses from relevant ministries and enterprises. The article distinguishes official facts from analytical questions and does not allege wrongdoing by any named individual.

Editorial disclaimer: Independent public-interest analysis based on cited public records. This article is not legal, financial or investment advice. Interpretations about revival feasibility, policy decisions and industrial capability should be read alongside the cited sources and stated limitations.

 

BIZ MASALA

Murthy ASR

Business | Economy | Insight