A BIZ MASALA FORENSIC INVESTIGATION

THE MISSING AMUL OF INDIAN HORTICULTURE

Farmers Grow the Produce. Who Captures the Wealth?

By Murthy ASR | 11 October 2026

HERO IMAGE | From farm to processing line to consumer shelf: how much value returns to the farmer?

The question is bigger than Amul

India has already promoted farmer collectives, food processing, cold chains and integrated value chains. The real question is whether these initiatives have become durable, commercially competent, farmer-owned systems that improve growers’ net income and bargaining power.

This investigation does not assume that horticulture needs one giant national cooperative, nor that every private intermediary is exploitative. It asks whether India can adapt Amul’s most useful principles—producer ownership, aggregation, professional management, value addition and market access—to crops that are seasonal, perishable and commercially diverse.

Our test is not turnover, membership or installed capacity alone. It is measurable farmer wealth after costs, risks and delayed payments—and whether the enterprise can survive without permanent operating support.

1. The scale of the opportunity

India’s third advance estimates for 2023–24 put horticulture production at 353.19 million tonnes, including about 112.73 million tonnes of fruits and 205.80 million tonnes of vegetables. These are estimates for that crop year, not current final production figures. They show the scale of the supply base, but not how much is economically available for processing. [1]

Measure	2023–24 estimate	Implication
Total horticulture	353.19 million tonnes	Large, diverse supply base
Fruits	112.73 million tonnes	Crop-specific grading and processing
Vegetables	205.80 million tonnes	High volume, highly perishable and price-sensitive

2. The losses problem—and the limits of a simple solution

Aggregation and grading can improve handling only when linked to viable buyers.

A Ministry of Food Processing Industries reply citing the 2022 NABCONS study reported post-harvest losses of 6.02–15.05% for fruits and 4.87–11.61% for vegetables, varying by commodity. These are ranges—not one national rate to apply to all produce. The earlier ICAR-CIPHET study reported different ranges. [2]

CHART 1 | Officially reported commodity ranges from the NABCONS 2022 study, as reproduced by the Ministry.

Losses occur during harvesting, handling, grading, packaging, transport, storage and unsold inventory. Processing can absorb some produce that fails fresh-market specifications, but it cannot make every rejected lot profitable. Food safety, maturity, recovery rate, energy cost and buyer requirements still apply.

3. What Amul teaches—and what it cannot solve automatically

The transferable principles are producer ownership, aggregation, professional processing and market access.

Amul links village-level producer societies, district unions and a state-level marketing federation. A 2025 Ministry of Cooperation document describes 36 lakh milk producers and 18,600 village dairy cooperative societies within a three-tier structure. [3]

Milk is collected daily, creating frequent transactions and a relatively continuous raw-material flow. Horticulture is different: harvests are seasonal, crop varieties require different handling, a bumper harvest can overwhelm processing, and fresh-market sales may be more valuable than processing. India should adapt Amul’s principles, not copy its operating structure literally.

4. India has already built part of the policy architecture

Operation Greens aims to strengthen production clusters and FPOs, connect farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, develop farm-gate infrastructure and logistics, and expand processing. Its long-term scope was enlarged beyond tomato, onion and potato to 22 perishable crops. [4]

The existence of a scheme is not proof of impact. A proper audit must distinguish approvals, money released, construction completed, equipment installed, capacity used, products sold, operating profitability and farmer income effects.

· Which approved projects are operational, delayed or incomplete?

· What is the gap between installed capacity and actual throughput?

· Do processors have repeat buyers or depend on spot sales?

· How much public support was spent per active farmer and per rupee of additional farmer income?

· What happens after initial grant support ends?

A value chain succeeds only when it reaches repeat buyers at a viable delivered cost.

5. The FPO numbers: formation is not wealth creation

NABARD reported 6,217 FPOs registered under its promotion programme as of 31 May 2025, with 4,585 market-linked and 2,962 credit-linked. These categories may overlap and must not be added together. They describe programme status, not independently verified profitability, survival or member-income gains. [5]

CHART 2 | NABARD programme counts as of 31 May 2025; categories overlap and are not a funnel.

A market linkage is a useful first step, but a single sale does not prove a durable business. Credit linkage can support activity, but borrowing without reliable cash flow can increase risk. The investigation must establish how many organisations are commercially active and how many deliver sustained benefits to members.

6. Sahyadri Farms: a case to learn from, not proof of universal replication

NITI Aayog’s compendium describes Sahyadri Farms as a farmer collective/Farmer Producer Company that began in 2010 and developed crop-specific integrated value chains, initially focusing on grape exports and later expanding into other horticulture crops. It highlights quality management, technology and access to retail and export channels. [6]

This case demonstrates that a farmer-led model can be built; it does not prove that every region or crop can replicate it. We need audited performance over time, distribution of benefits among members, capital sources, export concentration, governance safeguards, rejection rates and comparison with similar non-member farmers.

7. Follow the farmer’s rupee

The retail–farm-gate price gap is not the same as intermediary profit. It includes grading, transport, packaging, spoilage, financing, labour, taxes where applicable, retailer costs and commercial risk. For each crop, we should reconstruct the value chain with comparable prices and explicit assumptions.

Stage	Evidence to collect	What it reveals
Farm gate	Receipts, deductions, weighment slips	Gross price and farmer net realisation
Aggregation / grading	Sorting costs, rejection and handling	Cost of meeting market specifications
Logistics / storage	Invoices, transit time, losses	Cold-chain and transport economics
Processing	Yield, energy, packaging, waste	Actual unit cost and recovery rate
Wholesale / retail / export	Contracts, invoices, returns and credit	Buyer economics and delivered value
Farmer benefit	Net receipts, timing, dividends, risk	Whether ownership improves farmer wealth

8. Why farmer-owned horticulture businesses may struggle

Risk	Why it matters
Seasonality	Fixed-cost assets can sit idle outside harvest windows.
Working capital	Farmers need prompt payment while buyers may pay later.
Market uncertainty	A plant is viable only if products sell at a price covering full costs.
Governance	Member ownership requires transparent rules, audits and capable managers.
Quality and traceability	Retail and export markets need consistent supply and food safety.
Over-investment	Subsidies can mask weak demand or poor utilisation.
Unequal distribution	Larger growers may capture more benefits unless small farmers have voice and access.

9. A practical architecture: linked crop clusters, not one giant cooperative

VILLAGE PRODUCER GROUPS / FPOs → DISTRICT AGGREGATION & GRADING → CROP-SPECIFIC PROCESSING / FRESH MARKET → BUYERS & BRANDS → MEASURABLE FARMER WEALTH

A plausible structure connects village groups and FPOs to district aggregation, grading and logistics, then to crop-specific processing and marketing companies. A regional or national brand should come only after quality, supply and buyer demand are proven.

· Farmers retain meaningful ownership and voting rights.

· Professional managers run procurement, quality, sales and finance.

· Processing decisions follow crop economics, not subsidy availability.

· Multiple buyer channels reduce dependence on one customer.

· Audited accounts disclose public support, utilisation, losses and member benefits.

· Fresh-market sales remain an option when they offer better net returns than processing.

10. The scorecard: did farmers become wealthier?

Metric	How to measure	Why it matters
Net realisation per kg	Receipts less transport, grading, fees and finance costs	What the farmer actually keeps
Income volatility	Price and income variation across seasons	Resilience during gluts
Loss / rejection rate	Baseline compared with post-intervention	Handling performance
Plant utilization	Actual throughput by month vs practical capacity	Asset productivity
Operating viability	Margins, cash flow, debt service	Can the business survive?
Member value	Dividends, patronage benefits, price gains	Does ownership pay?
Smallholder inclusion	Benefits by farm-size group	Who captures the gains?
Public cost-effectiveness	Support per active member and verified income gain	Value for taxpayers

11. The investigation plan

1. Build a project-level dataset from Operation Greens and related scheme records: approvals, releases, completion, capacity, utilisation and outcomes.

2. Select contrasting crop clusters and compare farmer-owned, private and traditional market channels.

3. Use official crop production and market-price data, mandi records, export data, audited accounts and farmer-level evidence.

4. Interview farmers across farm sizes, FPO leaders, processors, buyers, logistics firms, researchers, lenders and implementing agencies.

5. Compare participating farmers with similar non-participating farmers where data allow, controlling for crop, region, season and farm size.

6. Publish data gaps openly; missing evidence is not proof of failure, and spending is not proof of success.

Conclusion: the measure of success is farmer wealth

India has substantial horticulture output, programmes aimed at integrated value chains, an expanding FPO ecosystem and examples such as Sahyadri Farms that merit examination. The available evidence establishes that the idea is not new. It does not yet establish how broadly these mechanisms have improved farmers’ net income, how much public investment has generated durable capacity, or how many enterprises remain viable after support.

The next phase must follow money, produce and risk through the entire chain. Where farmer-owned systems work, we should identify the capabilities behind success. Where they struggle, we should test whether the causes are governance, demand, finance, infrastructure, policy design or a combination. The aim is neither to romanticise cooperatives nor to defend existing intermediaries; it is to establish which arrangements deliver the best measurable outcomes for farmers and consumers.

A horticulture revolution should be judged not by tonnes grown, plants built or FPOs registered—but by how much lasting wealth reaches the farmer.

Sources and research notes

· 1. Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare / PIB, Third Advance Estimates of horticultural crops, 2023–24, 21 September 2024.
https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2057249&lang=2&reg=48

· 2. Ministry of Food Processing Industries / PIB, Post Harvest Food Loss, 20 December 2022; includes NABCONS 2022 and ICAR-CIPHET 2015 estimates.
https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1885038&lang=2&reg=48

· 3. Ministry of Cooperation, Amul’s co-operative model, parliamentary annexure, 2025.
https://www.cooperation.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-11/USQ%203042%20English.pdf

· 4. Ministry of Food Processing Industries, Operation Greens scheme objectives and scope.
https://www.mofpi.gov.in/Schemes/operation-greens-scheme

· 5. NABARD, Promotion and Development of FPOs as on 31 May 2025.
https://www.nabard.org/contentsearch.aspx?AID=95&Key=CROP

· 6. NITI Aayog, Compendium of 75 Agri-Entrepreneur and Innovators, Sahyadri Farms case overview.
https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-03/Compendium-of-75-Agri-Entrepreneur-and-Innovators.pdf

· 7. Ministry of Food Processing Industries, Operation Greens project-status page.
https://mofpi.gov.in/en/Schemes/operation-greens/implementation-3/status-projects-1

· 8. Lalitha, N. (2019), Sahyadri FPO case study, Agricultural Economics Research Review.
https://indianjournals.com/article/aerr-32-conf-abs055

Methodology and editorial disclaimer

This is a public-interest economic investigation. Figures are attributed to source and period. Charts use cited data or are labelled as conceptual. The article does not allege misconduct by any company, official, cooperative or political party. Claims about failure, lobbying, corruption or misuse of public money require project-specific evidence and fair testing of alternative explanations.

Murthy ASR

Biz Masala | Business • Economy • Analysis • Insight

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THE MISSING AMUL OF INDIAN HORTICULTURE : Farmers Grow the Produce. Who Captures the Wealth?